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This research analyzes the performance of 467 record labels in 8 European countries
over a period of 13 years (2003-2015). The main goal is to explain a relative measure of
profitability in terms of observed variables, although the nature of the dataset also allows
us to include non-observed firm and country effects. To this end alternative models are
estimated and three main research questions are tested, namely: (1) the effect of the
dual structure of the recorded music market, in which a competitive segment and an
oligopoly coexist; (2) the extent and source of the volatility of profits in record labels;
and (3) the non-linear impact of size on performance.
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1 Introduction
The interest of researchers in the field of the economics of music has been
unbalanced. As Cameron (2016) notes in recent a survey on the state of
this field, while many empirical studies on recorded music have analyzed
consumers and their motivations, fewer have focused on the supply side
of the market and, to the best of our knowledge, none on firms financial
performance.
A significant amount of research in the field is due to the appeal of
the digitization process and its consequences for the production, market-
ing, distribution and consumption of recorded music. And yet profits, as a
measure of how the sector has performed under this changing technological
landscape, have been mainly absent from this debate. This research aims at
filling this gap by analyzing the performance of a sample of 467 record labels
in 8 European countries. We do so by estimating an econometric model to
identify the main determinants of profits and formulate and test hypotheses
on the impact on profits of the way the industry is organized.
Our research is related to the literature on the supply of recorded music
(in the general context of the cultural industries) and the strategies record
labels implement. The cultural industries rely on the unlimited pool of tal-
ent and ideas from creators and artists to produce contents that can be
marketed. Selecting and producing a constant flow of cultural products is
key in a market that depends on products with a short life cycle and a
low probability of breaking even. One key function of organizations in the
cultural industries is their role as intermediaries or gatekeepers. As Hirsch
(1972) points out, firms select the subset of cultural output from artists that
will reach consumers, a role that stems from the uncertainty that surrounds
cultural production. Cultural organizations address this uncertainty by en-
forcing links at different points of the industrys value chain, overproduction
and promotion.
Several authors relate this selection process and its results to innovation
(to be understood as product differentiation innovation, i.e. the release of
new artists and the emergence and stabilization of new genres), how it takes
place and the associated uncertainty, the risk-reducing effect of a diversified
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portfolio of recordings, and how these features are affected by the way the
industry is organised. Baker (1991) shows that market structure is the key to
understanding the number of releases of a record label. The author develops
a theoretical model of profit maximization and shows that the risk-reducing
effects of diversification are exhausted after a relatively small number of
releases (in relation to the total market for titles) which may suggest an
upper-limit to the advantages of a diversified catalog.
The increasing concentration of the recorded music industry and its im-
pact on market outcomes have been the main topic of several papers. Pe-
terson and Berger (1975) link innovation and diversity in popular music
to market structure, putting forward the hypothesis of increasing homoge-
nization and standardization as concentration within the industry increases.
This cultural homogenization has been revisited by various authors, such as
Lopes (1992), who claims that, despite the “effective unchallenged oligopolis-
tic control” of the industry, innovations and diversity are common because
of a reliance on independent producers —the open system or decentralized
production hypothesis—. More recently Dowd (2004) combining covariates
that capture market concentration, decentralized production and their in-
teractions in the same model, concludes that both hypotheses —cultural ho-
mogeneity and decentralized production — are statistically significant when
explaining new acts and recording firms using data from Billboard charts
from 1940 to 1990.
Discussion of market concentration and innovation emphasizes the struc-
tural duality of the industry, in which many small independent labels (con-
sistently identified as more active at product differentiation innovation and
at cultivating niche markets) compete alongside with much larger integrated
firms or majors. Several authors have discussed this point. Without being
exhaustive, Hesmondhalgh (1998) discusses reputation effects in indepen-
dent dance labels in Britain; Gander and Rieple (2004) analyze the dual
structure of the industry, the specific assets that majors and independents
hold and how those assets affect how innovations take place and how they
are exploited; Strachan (2007) analyzes the practice of micro-independent
labels and the impact on the mainstream music industry. Innovation, market
structure and gatekeeping is discussed in Ordanini (2006) who provides an
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empirical analysis of the different roles that majors and independents play in
the sector, and how this duality affects the way new cultural products reach
consumers. The author identifies a direct model (majors sign artists with
no prior experience in the industry) and an agency model (majors exploit
innovations developed by independent labels). In this scheme, independent
labels are innovators due to their strengths in identifying artists that might
succeed based on their better knowledge of local repertoire, exploitation
of niche markets and the artistic background of their managers. Evidence
from sales charts shows differentiated patterns of commercial success for the
different selection models.
The supply of innovations and record label performance is analyzed in
Burke (1996) using charts and market share in single and album markets,
while Hendricks and Sorensen (2009) discuss product discovery when infor-
mation constraints are in place and how strategies to deal with these affect
innovation, as record labels might be under-investing in narrowly defined
niche markets. Bourreau et al. (2012) analyze the management strategies
that have emerged as a response to digitization. The authors identify alter-
native value creation and capture mechanisms that define business models
in the recorded music industry, and suggest a big bang of managerial innova-
tions through different “experimentation paths”, which can be successfully
managed by imitating successful models or by smaller more flexible labels.
More recently, Bourreau et al. (2013) survey 151 French record labels in an
attempt to test the long-tail hypothesis by estimating two specifications for
creative output (number of new releases) and commercial output (sales).
The authors find that digitization leads to greater creative output but does
not improve sales. Interestingly, commercial output, a profit or performance-
related variable, is found to be positively related to number of employees
and catalog size, both of which are related to firm size.
The above discussion shows that the recorded music industry has been
analyzed from alternative perspectives, but no research analyzing profits
and their determinants has been undertaken. This paper contributes to
the literature in the economics of music in two ways. First, it analyzes
and explains profits in terms of firm and market-specific variables, provid-
ing further insight into the supply of the recorded music industry and the
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determinants of performance. Specifically, it takes into account the organi-
zation of the industry and how its dual structure (majors/independents) has
a non-negligible impact in the performance of record labels. Second, it puts
forward a framework in which unobserved heterogeneity across firms and
markets is explicitly modeled, allowing us to interpret the breakdown of un-
explained differences in profits in terms of: (i) transitory shocks (temporary
annual increases or decreases in performance due to greater or lesser success
of the normal operation of the firm which must be linked to its catalog of
releases), (ii) permanent firm features (endowment or lack of resources spe-
cific to the firm, such as managerial practices or organizational structures),
and (iii) market conditions (the institutional environment in which record
labels operate).
In so doing, a model has been estimated using public financial infor-
mation. We gather data on 467 record labels in eight European countries
(Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the UK) over
a period of 13 years (2003 to 2015). Taking into account that data are lon-
gitudinal, that is, measurements for different years for each record label, a
panel data approach has been used. Additionally, as firms are clustered into
countries, a three-level hierarchical model has also been tested. Hypotheses
are posited on the role of record label size, and the specific structure of the
industry in explaining profits. The paper is organized as follows. Firstly,
we introduce the empirically testable hypotheses. Next, we describe the
dataset and summarize its most outstanding features. Then, we present the
estimation strategy, its results and a discussion of the findings. Finally, the
last section concludes.
2 Research hypotheses
The empirical literature on the determinants of profits —examples are Mc-
Gahan (1999), McGahan and Porter (1999), Goddard et al. (2005), Goddard
et al. (2009) and Bou and Satorra (2007) to mention just a few— provides
two primary lines of research with regards to the modeling of a firm’s per-
formance. On the one hand, the industrial economics perspective identifies
profits as the outcome of industry features such as barriers due to costs,
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regulations, concentration, among others, that limit or prevent competition
altogether. Different market structures explain differences in profits between
industries. Empirical studies aimed at identifying between-industry differ-
ences use samples of firms from different sectors in order to estimate the
effect of these barriers.
On the other hand, the strategic management literature focuses on the
assets that are specific to the firm and that may explain performance. These
could be tangible or intangible resources, such as organizational structures
or management practices to mention only two. This strand of the literature
aims at explaining the observed variability in profits at industry level, where
differences in performance are the outcome of between-firm differences. It is
worth noting that both analyses need not be mutually exclusive and indeed
they are jointly considered as complementary explanations of performance.
Although the present research, being focused on the recorded music in-
dustry, lacks a between-industry analysis, the industrys dual market struc-
ture —an oligopoly, the majors, catering for the largest chunk of the market
plus a more diverse and competitive segment, the independent labels, com-
posed of many smaller firms— permits the testing of hypotheses on industry
organization as a source of profits.
In this context, we propose a model of the financial performance of record
labels. Let yijt be profits for firm i in period t. We use the subscript j to
account for institutional and economic differences at country level that might
have an impact on performance. Then we make profits depend on:
yijt = f(MAJORijt, SIZEijt, FINijt, CONCENTRATIONjt) (1)
In expression (1) we formulate a model for record label profits that de-
pends on type of record company (major or independent) —MAJOR—, firm
size —SIZE—, the firms financial position and balance sheet structure —
FIN—, and market concentration —CONCENTRATION. On that basis, we posit
and discuss hypotheses on the impact of the structure of the industry and
the extent of the effect of size on profits
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2.1 The organization of the recording industry
The model includes the distinction between majors and independent record
labels to account for the effect on profits of the organization of the recorded
music industry. When dealing with the supply of recorded music, the litera-
ture consistently singles out its two-tier structure —the distinction between
majors and independent labels— and its impact from an organizational point
of view.
The three majors (Sony, Warner and Universal) are part of entertain-
ment and media multinational corporations and as such they have unrivaled
financial clout and are responsible for most commercially successful artists,
albums and songs. In terms of market share, according to the Worldwide
Independent Network Market Report1 majors account for roughly 62% of
the global market. This share is even greater in European markets where it
ranges between 80-90%. One would expect this disparity in market clout and
in the success of their respective portfolios of artists to lead to differences
in performance.
While there are size differences between independent and major record
labels, the different performances of majors and independents cannot, how-
ever, be strictly a matter of size. Some cost advantages are independent
of scale, such as those related to experience and knowledge of the market,
access to a network of resources and expertise. As long as independent la-
bels lack access to these specific resources they will find themselves at a
disadvantage.
There are also differences in business and management styles as well as
institutional arrangements with an economic impact that tend to be different
in majors and independents. Such differences include contractual relations
with artists and bands, or the ownership of sound recordings which impacts
on assets and back catalog,2 to mention but two. It has been argued else-
where —see for instance Gander and Rieple (2004) or Tschmuck (2012)—
that most music innovations take place in the independents labels and once
these catch on they are exploited by majors with the financial clout and
1See http://winformusic.org/wintel/.
2While major labels usually retain the copyright on the sound recording of an act,
independent labels do not.
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managerial resources to market them profitably. Thus artists backed by the
financial muscle and network connections of majors are on a faster track to
success (see Ordanini, 2006).
In short, and consistently with the above observations, majors can be
expected to have a performance premium. Therefore:
H1 There is a positive majors-effect on profits.
Additionally, the more open approach of independent record labels to-
wards innovation and musical diversity could also be linked to a greater
assumption of risks. Whether this innovative behavior is reflected in per-
formance is open to discussion. Less risk averse independent labels could
exhibit a larger observed variability in profits. It is, however, true that in
a market so dependent on a continuous flow of new releases (few of which
break even) the size of a firm’s catalog, that is, its portfolio, is important and
by enlarging and diversifying its portfolio a firm can mitigate risk. Both the
fewer number of releases and the smaller back catalog as well as the concen-
tration in specific segments of the market may explain a larger than average
observed variability in profits. Therefore:
H2 Independent record labels exhibit greater variability of profits than ma-
jors.
In the discussion section we seek a consistent explanation for the source of
this variability.
2.2 The role of size
In line with the aforementioned empirical research on profits, we expect
an impact of firm size on performance. The dual structure of the industry
imperfectly correlates with the size of recorded music labels. While most ma-
jors are significantly larger than independent record labels —mainly small
and medium-sized enterprises— there is wide diversity among the indepen-
dents.
Since the mid-sixties (see Tschmuck, 2012) the development of the mu-
sic industry has been characterized by a process of market concentration.
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Either through horizontal mergers or through the acquisition of competi-
tors, the major players in the industry have become bigger both in terms
of catalog, market share and assets. The extent to which this generates
economies of scale is debatable, as new digital technologies have drastically
reduced production costs for record labels and marketing possibilities have
been enhanced by the Internet and social networks. Nonetheless there may
well be economies of scope from managing an increasing catalog. The ques-
tion is at what point are these scale and scope economies (that we relate to
size) exhausted.
To estimate the expected effect of size on profits we need first to have an
operational definition of size. In this respect we stick to the convention used
in the finance literature and resort to total assets as the measure of the size
of a firm. We expect the volume of total assets to correlate with a record
labels catalog and its financial and other key resources in the production
and marketing of music.
A larger size that leads to the achievement of greater efficiencies will
expand profits. However, for moderate scale advantages and if the scope of
production is exhausted for a certain catalog size, then diseconomies might
kick in due to the greater complexity of managing larger organizations. In
this case an inverse U-shaped effect of size on profits could be expected,
leading to a non-linear relationship between profits and total assets. We
formulate this argument with H3:
H3 The relation between profits and size is non-linear (profits increase up
to a given size and decrease thereafter).
3 The dataset
3.1 Sample selection
To test H1–H3 a sample of financial data for recorded music firms was
selected from Amadeus, a database of comparable financial information for
public and private companies across Europe compiled by Bureau van Dijk.
The dataset covers over 19 million companies in 43 European countries.
Amadeus collects and normalizes the data from information providers, which
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in most cases are national registries where audited annual accounts are filed.
Normalization to a standard format makes the financial information compa-
rable across countries. It should be noted that Regulation 1606/2002 of the
European Parliament and the European Council on the application of inter-
national accounting standards has led to a greater convergence of accounting
standards in Europe.
Unconsolidated financial data were gathered for record labels in 8 Euro-
pean countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the UK. The choice of countries was based on the availability of the relevant
data. As financial information disclosure requirements differ from country
to country, only those that offered a reasonable and comparable amount
of information were chosen. Overall these countries represent 34% of the
recorded music business in the European region, as reported by IFPI.3
The selection of record labels was based on the identification of firms
whose main activity is recorded music. The eligibility criterion was the
membership list of the International Federation of the Phonographic In-
dustry (IFPI), the main body representing the sector in the eight target
countries. This list includes majors and most independent companies. The
dataset was enlarged in a second round using information on members of the
Independent Music Companies Association (IMPALA) that are not mem-
bers of IFPI, in all cases smaller independent firms or micro-labels. Overall
we obtained information for a panel of 467 record labels over the period
from 2003 to 2015. Note that the panel is unbalanced, as values for specific
variables are not available for all years/firms. This is specially so with vari-
ables such as number of employees and operating revenue. Below we outline
the description of the variables employed in the analysis.
3.2 Dependent variables
Performance is measured through a relative measure of profits before taxes.
For every firm in the database return on total assets (ROA) has been col-
lected. ROA, defined as the ratio of profits/losses before taxes over total
assets, is the most widely used measure of performance in the empirical
3See SGAE (2012).
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literature on the determinants of profits.
Additionally, and as a robustness check, we use a binary qualitative
measure (profits/losses) in the modeling strategy. The advantage of such a
variable is that it is independent of any measure of size.
3.3 Explanatory variables
For each firm in the dataset, the following information is gathered:
1. Country of the firm.
2. Number of employees.
3. Operating revenue.
4. Total assets as per the balance sheet.
5. Total fixed assets
6. Total intangible fixed assets.
7. Financial ratios: liquidity and gearing ratio.
With this information the following explanatory variables are produced.
MAJOR: We classify the record labels in the sample with a dummy vari-
able that takes value 1 if it is a major and 0 otherwise. Major firms are
identified based on their global ultimate owner (GUO). GUO of majors
were: Vivendi (owner of Universal and other labels such as A&M, Capitol
or Virgin to cite some), Sony Corporation (owner of Sony music and labels
such as Arista, Columbia, Epic and CBS), AI Entertainment Holdings LLC
(owner of Warner Music Group, Sire and Parlophone among others) and
Citigroup Inc. (owner of EMI until 2012, when parts of its business were
sold to Universal). Based on this classification, out of 467 record labels,
66 were classified as majors (roughly 14% of the sample). Note that this
includes not only the four majors,4 but also sub-labels and subsidiaries that
operate autonomously. We expect being a major to have a positive impact
on profits, in accordance with H1
4Given the time span of the sample, we still include EMI as a separate firm.
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OWNERSHIP: An independence indicator has been used. This indicator
is provided in the database and has been used to identify the degree of
independence of a company with regard to its shareholders. On that basis we
built a dummy variable that takes value 1 when there is no shareholder with
ownership percentage greater than 50% and 0 otherwise. We incorporate
this covariate to evaluate if and how the ownership structure of a firm affects
its performance. The financial literature relates increasing concentration in
ownership to a reduction in the potential extent of agency problems and,
therefore, to an incentive effect on performance
TOTALASSETS: The book value of total assets (and its square) is used
to account for the size of record labels. We aim at identifying efficiency
advantages related to size and whether they are exhausted at some point
(H3).
EMPLOYEE: We also use the total number of employees of a record label as
a proxy for its size. There are different ways in which the size of a firm can
be approached: total assets, sales, value added or number of employees are
commonly used measures. Assets stress the technological aspects of produc-
tion (namely scale and scope economies). However, from an organizational
standpoint (how hierarchies and complexity play a role in performance) the
number of employees can be an alternative and suitable measure of size.
RATIOFIXED: The ratio of fixed assets to total assets is used as a mea-
sure of the relative relevance of plant, equipment and other infrastructure
for the record label. Digital technologies have drastically transformed the
landscape in which record labels operate, and in particular, depreciate the
value of assets that were once key to success when the physical production,
distribution and marketing model was prevalent. CD pressing plants, ware-
housing or distribution networks become irrelevant when the business model
changes to one dependent on the delivery of digitized information. From dis-
cussions with members of the industry it became apparent that embracing
the digital business model has gone hand in hand with a process of shedding
fixed assets that could otherwise hinder record label profitability.
RATIOINTANGIBLE: The ratio of intangible assets over total assets. Fixed
intangible assets —not categorized as fixed assets— are mainly copyrights
on sound recordings. This could be considered as a proxy for the relative size
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of a record labels catalog, although there can be stark differences between
labels depending on contractual relations with performers and who holds
the rights to sound recordings. A larger share of intangible assets over total
assets could have a positive effect on performance, as the label focuses on
revenue-generating activities.
LIQUIDITYRATIO: The liquidity ratio is the ratio of current assets (net of
stocks) to current liabilities. It measures the ability of a company to meet
its short-term debt obligations, but can be interpreted as an indicator of
managerial conservatism or risk-aversion. Empirical studies in the literature
show a positive impact on profits.
GEARINGRATIO: The fraction of non-current liabilities plus loans to share-
holder funds is the gearing ratio. It is a measure of financial leverage and,
hence, of the financial risk a company takes. Studies in the literature find a
negative impact on profits
All of the above capture firm-specific features. We also include a market-
level variable to grasp differences in countries due to market conditions. The
Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI) provides a measure of the concentration
of the market in which a firm operates, and it is calculated using information




ij , with sij being the market share of firm i in
market j. We use the concentration index as a measure of the competitive
conditions in a market, the larger the index the more concentrated the mar-
ket. All else being equal, we expect profits to increase with concentration.
3.4 Descriptive statistics on the sample
Table 1 shows average data on profits, market and firm size by country. It
can be seen that the average firm in the sample has roughly an operating
revenue of 12 million euros, assets valued at 22 million and 28 employees,
and an average return on assets equal to 2.77%. However the heterogeneity
of the music industry is obvious from the diversity of results at country
level. Table 1 reveals that firms in different countries perform differently:
ROA ranges from -1.10% in Spain to 11.81% in Austria. It is important
to remark that these are rough averages, that is, unweighted averages over
firms and years, and as such do not discriminate between firms. In terms of
12
size, unsurprisingly, UK and France have the largest record labels per assets
and employees, which is also reflected in mean operating revenue. Overall,
we see that there is heterogeneity at country level worth analyzing.
The differences between majors and independents become apparent in
table 2. Majors are larger in terms of assets (total and fixed), employment
and revenue. Profits are also larger on average. In this regard, examination
of frequency distributions for profits (using ROA as the measure) shows
that:
• The distribution of profits for majors is significantly more concentrated
around the mean than that of independents. While the mean for ma-
jors is 4.72%, that of independents is 2.31%, with standard deviations
of 15.88 and 21.50 respectively. Not only the standard deviation, but
also the coefficient of variation is larger for independent labels, which
points to greater variability in the independents.
• The first and third quartile in both distributions are 0.62% and 10.25%
for majors and -3.81% and 9.86% for independents. In other words
negative instances are more frequent for independents than for ma-
jors. Thus independents show a greater interquartile range, thereby
reinforcing the evidence for profits being more scattered in the case of
independent record labels.
These two observations are consistent with the risk-reducing effect of a
larger portfolio or catalog in the case of majors compared to independent
record labels. It would also be consistent with the view of majors being
more conservative compared to greater risk-taking by independents. In any
case this is simply a descriptive analysis and we need to check whether this
variability holds after accounting for other potential sources of variation.
Finally, table 3 includes information on the ownership structure of the
sample. The database assigns an independence indicator to each company
which determines, when possible, the distribution of shareholders. Based
on this information the percentage of companies with a greater ownership
spread —no shareholder owning more than 50%— represent roughly 16.3%
of the sample.
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4 Modeling performance: a hierarchical model for
profits
4.1 Econometric model
The econometric specification of model 1 exploits the longitudinal structure
of the data. Two alternative specifications for panel data —a random effects
and a fixed effects model— are formulated. In addition, and due to the
hierarchical structure of the data —observations on profits over years for
firms, with firms clustered in countries— we also explore the adequacy of a
three-level model with random effects both at firm and country level.
Let ytji be profits at period t for firm j in country i. Assume these to be
determined by a set of explanatory variables. The econometric model is:
yijt = β0ij +β1×HHI+β2×MAJOR+β3×OWNERSHIP+β4× ln(TOTALSASSETS)
+ β5 × ln(TOTALSASSETS)2 + β6 × ln(EMPLOYEES) + β7RATIOFIXED
+ β7 × RATIOINTANGIBLE + β8 × LIQUIDITY + β9 × GEARING + εijt
(2)
In expression (2) we take the natural logarithm (base e) of TOTALASSETS
and EMPLOYEES. Moreover, the coefficient β0ij includes a fixed intercept for
all observations (β0), a specific random intercept for each firm (U0ij) and a
specific random intercept for each country (U0j), such that
β0ij = β0 + U0ij + U0j (3)
In short, expression (3) includes unobserved differences between firms (U0ij)
and countries (U0j) as random variables that shift profits accordingly. Ex-
pressions (2)–(3) outline a model in which two sources explain profits:
1. Observed firm and country-related variables. This source of variation
is explained by the covariates in (2) and described in section 3.3.
2. Unobserved heterogeneity, that can be split into three components:
(a) Transitory shocks to profitability: εijt. These are year-to-year un-
expected changes in within-firms profits, and can be interpreted
as the changes in performance due to greater or lesser success of
the normal operation of the firm, a feature that must be linked
to its catalog of releases.
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(b) Unobserved firm-specific variation: U0ij . This is attributed to
the heterogeneity across firms, and could be assimilated to firm-
specific assets or management styles whose availability (or lack
thereof) increases (or decreases) a firm’s profits. In short, it is a
firms permanent trait.
(c) Unobserved country-specific variation: U0j . This can be attributed
to the heterogeneity across countries, including traits such as the
share of domestic repertoire, its variety and innovativeness, the
countrys formal and informal institutions (such as the legal frame-
work and enforcement of property rights) and its culture —see
Power and Hallencreutz (2002)—, or general economic conditions.
Some geographical aspects can also be related to the performance
of firms, such as the spatial structure of production, or the exis-
tence of locational variations in creativity or easier accessibility
to specific resources that lead to benefits of geographical agglom-
eration —see Scott (1999).
To sum up, estimating model (2)–(3) it is possible to break up the share
of the variability of profits into observed and unobserved factors that can be
attributed to geography and the institutional and economic environment and
to the endowment of specific assets and/or resources linked to the managerial
expertise of record labels. Estimation results provide coefficients for the
observed variables and a breakdown of the unexplained variance into within-
firm variability (due to εijt), between-firms variability (due to U0ij) and
country variability (due to U0j). However this comes at a cost, in terms
of the more stringent assumptions needed.5 We therefore present below
two standard approaches to regression with panel data —fixed and random
5One needs to assume strong exogeneity, and error terms and random effects at both
levels being iid. Let X be the set of explanatory variables. Then:
E[εijt|U0ij , U0j , X] = 0
εijt ∼ [0, σ2ε ]
U0ij |X,u0i ∼ [0, φ2]
U0j |X ∼ [0, ψ2]
15
effects— and a three-level model and perform specification tests to validate
the estimates.
4.2 Estimation results
Table 4 shows the results of estimating different econometric specifications
of model (2)–(3). Specifically we present estimates for two panel data mod-
els —fixed effects (model a) and random effects (model b)— and 3-level
hierarchical model estimates (models c, d and e).
As for the model selection strategy, note that for the panel data regres-
sion —model (a) and (b)— a Hausman test fails to reject the null, hence
the random effects model (b) is preferred. When comparing the random
effects model with a 3-level model a likelihood ratio test supports the latter.
Additionally variances at the different levels are significant —except for the
variance at country level for model (c)— even though the greatest share of
the variability occurs at the within-firm level. Note that specification (c)
includes the whole set of covariates while in (d) we drop employees and the
ratio of intangible assets which account for the largest share of missing data.
Overall model (d) is supported by the data. Furthermore, as a robustness
check, specification (e) estimates model (d) dropping major record labels
from the sample.
As for the estimated coefficients, four results stand out. Firstly, there
is evidence of a significant positive majors-effect. The 3-level models for
the full sample of record labels (models c and d) show a positive estimate
with a significance level below 10%. Note also that for the non-significant
result, the random effects model (b), one can marginally reject a lower tail
null hypothesis (p-value less than 10%). According to these results, being a
major record label positively increases performance (measured as return on
assets) by roughly 4%, which reveals a performance premium for majors.
Secondly, the financial standing, size, and structure of the balance sheet
matter. Here all estimations except for (a) show that the greater the share
of fixed assets (over total assets) the lower the profits. This finding appears
logical because in the digital realm fixed assets tend to be less relevant and
may even hinder growth or the embrace of new business models. Moreover,
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the point estimate for this effect marginally increases over time, as new
business models develop.6
On the other hand, size, measured by the value of the assets, is significant
and empirical evidence supports a non-linear specification. The net effect
of total assets describes an inverted U-shape, with a maximum within the
sample range which suggests the existence of an optimal size. The number
of employees, which can be an additional measure of size and organizational
complexity, is found to have a negative effect on profits (non-linearities were
rejected), although information on number of employees was missing for
67% of the sample units. In addition, the leverage of a company not only
increases its risk but also reduces its performance, as seen by the coefficient
attached to the gearing ratio in all the estimated models.
Thirdly, there is evidence of market concentration differences playing a
role in profits. The estimated effect of the HHI concentration index is positive
and significant for all models, as expected.
Turning to the market and firm unobserved effects, the estimated models
provide a breakdown of the unaccounted variability at each level once we
have controlled for observed covariates. Examination of the variance of the
estimated random intercepts in models (d) and (e) shows that the amount of
variability attached to between-country differences is around 3% of the total
variability. Between-firms variability is 22-24%, while within-firm variability
is around 73-74%. The evidence supports unobserved variability at firm
level due to transitory shocks to be the main source of unobserved profit
variability, although permanent between-firm differences and country level
do also play a role.
Finally, a brief comment on the estimation results for the subsample of
independent music labels (model e) is in order. The rationale behind this
exercise is to check the robustness of the above results when excluding the
6An anonymous referee suggested us to test for this increasingly negative effect. In so
doing, we estimated the model for two subsamples: before and after 2008 (first introduction
of Spotify, a music streaming service, in main European markets). The negative effect of
the ratio of fixed assets over total assets is larger (and its significance greater) in the
second sample, although the large standard error of the pre-2008 estimation yields wide
confidence intervals.
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biggest players in the recorded music market. Overall, we consider results
are quite robust with the above findings: qualitatively the negative effects
of fixed assets and leverage, and the nonlinear effect of size are present.
As for the relative size of the variances at the three levels no differences in
their breakdown are found. Hence one can conclude that there are no large
departures in the results for the sub-sample of independent labels from those
of the full sample.
4.3 Discussion of the results
We now assess the likelihood of the hypotheses posited in section 2. First, we
have found support for hypothesis H1 on the existence of a positive majors-
effect in all the three-level models —table 4, models (c), (d) and (e)—, while
evidence has been somewhat weaker in the random effects specification.
Consistent explanations with this observed profit premium can be linked to
majors having the access to resources and assets to exploit and market the
creative process involved in the recording of music, or to managerial skills
or specific organizational arrangements. Additionally, this over-performance
can also be explained by factors related to the industry structure, such
as market power (the ability to push for better economic conditions on
digital platforms), direct (through ownership) and indirect links with the
promotional value chain of the industry, their financial clout or the profitable
exploitation of an enormous back catalog that continues to generate a steady
flow of income.
Second, it has been hypothesized (H2) that independent record labels
experience higher volatility in profits. While this higher volatility was sug-
gested in the descriptive analysis of the sample, we need to check, after
taking into account all other sources of variability, whether independent la-
bels still have a larger variance. To do so we estimate model (d) with two
alternative functional forms in which the variability between independents
and majors differs because: (1) the permanent component at firm level shows
greater variability in the case of independents (variability of the term U0ij is
larger for independent record labels) ; (2) transitory shocks to profitability
(error term εijt) show larger variance for independents. The first functional
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form assumes that the random intercept at firm level U0ij in model (2)–(3)
differs between majors and independent labels. Consider this to be the en-
dowment (or lack thereof) of an asset specific to the firm. This setup implies
a greater variability in its endowment for independents. The latter assumes
heteroskedastic residuals that depend on the type of record label (major
or independent) implying that shocks are larger for independents than for
majors. It could be interpreted as the variability of the commercial success
of a firms portfolio of new releases in a year being larger for independents
than for majors.
The results in table 5 provide evidence of different variability in profits
that, once modeled as a specific random effect or through heretoskedas-
tic residuals, supports hypothesis H2.7 Comparison of both specifications
using information criteria —Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayes
information criterion (BIC)— favors the higher variability of the transitory
effect. It has been proposed that this greater variability is due to unob-
served traits: a smaller catalog, or independents being less averse to risk or
a combination of both could be likely explanations.
To seek for further evidence we have re-estimated the variance param-
eters in table 5 removing the top and bottom 25% of the sample in terms
of assets. We expect the remaining firms (majors and independents) in
this subsample to be more similar not only in size but also in terms of re-
leases and catalog. In short their portfolio will be subject to less variability.
We consider that finding no statistically significant differences in variances
would be supportive of the smaller catalog explanation as the source of this
greater variability. Otherwise both hypotheses would be likely.
Findings still favor the transitory shock hypothesis as the source of the
variability, with estimated variances being 197 and 119.5 for independents
and majors respectively. The fact that significant differences in volatility
persist in this restricted sample makes both explanations (differences in
catalog and risk-aversion) consistent with the empirical evidence. In this
respect, results are inconclusive.
Third, there is support for a non-linear effect of size on profits (hypothesis
7As the estimates of the fixed part of the model do not differ from those in model (d)
in table 4, we only report the variance decomposition in table 5.
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H3). Increasing the size of the firm, measured by the total valuation of its
assets, increases profits but only up to a point. Figure 1 illustrates the
net effect of size on profits, against (the natural log of) total assets for
two different estimates in table 4 —models (d) and (e). Interestingly, it
can be seen that, independently of the magnitude of the effect, both are
maximum at about the same size. The intuition behind the estimates is
that increasing the size of a firm will not necessarily lead to higher profits if
that firm is already too large, which would be the case of the majors in the
sample. In contrast, smaller firms, with most independent firms falling into
this category, could benefit from a larger size.
This effect can be illustrated with back of the envelope calculations using
the point estimates in table 4. We calculate the maximum effect of size at a
value of the log of total assets of 7.3 —(d)— or 7.18 —(e). Figure 2 shows
a box plot of the log of assets for both independents and majors. Based on
the estimated size effect, most observations for major record labels would
be too large, while the opposite would happen in the case of independents.
In this case the estimated size effect could have a practical implication both
in terms of the consolidation process that has been taking place among the
majors —which, based on the estimated effect, would be a profit decreasing
effect— and of the need for smaller independent firms to become larger to
gain efficiency.
Finally, the estimates are robust to sample restrictions and alternative
econometric specifications. It has been shown that qualitative results hold
when we drop majors from the sample. Additionally, and following a ref-
eree’s suggestion, a time trend was included to account for the collapse of
the recorded music market over the period analyzed. As expected, the trend
was significant and negative, and there was no change in sign, magnitude
or significance of the rest of covariates.8 Furthermore, a binary data model
was estimated using profit/loss as the dependent variable to provide fur-
ther evidence on the hypotheses tested, and to re-asses the robustness of
the results. The rationale behind this exercise is to avoid the limitations of
ROA as a measure of profits. Note that, as ROA is the ratio of profits to
8However there was some ambiguity as to the preferred model based on information
criteria, as BIC and AIC led to contradictory results.
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assets, the way a firm manages its assets could lead to different ROA values
for the same amount of profit.9 Qualitative results hold: data support the
random effects specification and we find evidence of a positive majors-effect,
a positive effect of HHI, a negative effect of the ratio of fixed assets and the
gearing ratio, and a non-linear effect of total assets on the probability of
profits. Results are shown in table 6.
5 Conclusions
The present research sheds some new light on the supply side in the recorded
music industry, more specifically on the factors that determine the perfor-
mance of record labels.
First of all, we found that the structure of the recording industry has a
significant and consistent effect on profits. In all estimated models, there
is evidence of majors overperforming independent labels thereby supporting
the hypothesis of a positive majors-effect. This effect, independent of size
as it was controlled for in all models, is consistent with the literature in that
it can be related to access to specific resources, accumulated knowledge,
expertise and connections (especially in the promotional value chain), that
enhance the ability to exploit and market successful innovations.
Second, we analyzed the variability of profits within the modeling frame-
work, and found that, after controlling for all the explanatory variables, in-
dependents show greater variability. Evidence supports the source of this
variability as transitory innovations rather than permanent firm character-
istics. It makes sense in a market with a short product life cycle highly
dependent on a continuous stream of new products with very uncertain re-
sults. In this case the success of the portfolio of new releases determines
the performance of the firm, and one can expect profit variability to be in-
fluenced by the firms size. The greater catalog and number of releases by
majors or more innovative independent record labels are consistent explana-
tions of the observed volatility. At this point, this remains an open question
worthy of further research.
9E.g. ownership of sound recordings is considered an asset, a practice that is not that
common for smaller independent firms.
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Third, a non-linear size effect has been consistently found. Evidence
points to the performance of record labels benefiting from economies of scale
and/or scope up to a point. From this we conclude that size plays a role by
hindering profits for either too large or too small record labels. Linked to
this is the fact that fixed assets, of less value when the business model turns
towards the digital distribution of contents, also reduce profitability.
Fourth, though results show that most of the variability in performance
comes from within-firm innovations —how well a firm performs in one spe-
cific time period which should be attributed to how well its releases fare—,
it is also between-firms and to a minor extent country dependent. Firm het-
erogeneity that can be related to differences in organizational structure or
management practices, or the implementation of successful business models
explains around 25% of the total variation in profit between firms. An even
smaller percentage (but statistically significant) is related to specific market
conditions or between-countries heterogeneity.
Our results have some limitations. It would have been desirable to in-
clude more countries and more varied information (beyond purely finan-
cial data) to better account for country and firm level variability. This
information would have provided additional ways of controlling for firm-
heterogeneity that at this point is unobserved and therefore mostly included
in the random effect at firm level. However, beyond the obvious limita-
tions with the sample due to data availability, the robustness of the findings
supports the foregoing analysis of the factors explaining the profitability of
record labels and the main conclusions.
22
References
Baker, A. J.(1991). A model of competition and monopoly in the record
industry. Journal of Cultural Economics, 15(1):29–53.
Bou, J. C. and A. Satorra(2007). The persistence of abnormal returns at
industry and firm levels: Evidence from spain. Strategic Management
Journal, 28(7):707–722.
Bourreau, M., M. Gensollen, and F. Moreau(2012). The impact of a radical
innovation on business models: Incremental adjustments or big bang?
Industry and Innovation, 19(5):415–435.
Bourreau, M., M. Gensollen, F. Moreau, and P. Waelbroeck(2013). selling
less of more? the impact of digitization on record companies. Journal of
cultural economics, 37(3):327–346.
Burke, A. E.(1996). The dynamics of product differentiation in the british
record industry. Journal of Cultural Economics, 20(2):145–164.
Cameron, S.(2016). Past, present and future: music economics at the cross-
roads. Journal of Cultural Economics, 40(1):1–12.
Dowd, T. J.(2004). Concentration and diversity revisited: production log-
ics and the us mainstream recording market, 1940–1990. Social forces,
82(4):1411–1455.
Gander, J. and A. Rieple(2004). How relevant is transaction cost economics
to inter-firm relationships in the music industry? Journal of Cultural
Economics, 28(1):57–79.
Goddard, J., M. Tavakoli, and J. O. Wilson(2005). Determinants of prof-
itability in European manufacturing and services: evidence from a dy-
namic panel model. Applied Financial Economics, 15(18):1269–1282.
Goddard, J., M. Tavakoli, and J. O. Wilson(2009). Sources of variation in
firm profitability and growth. Journal of Business Research, 62(4):495–
508.
23
Hendricks, K. and A. Sorensen(2009). Information and the skewness of music
sales. Journal of political Economy, 117(2):324–369.
Hesmondhalgh, D.(1998). The british dance music industry: a case study of
independent cultural production. British Journal of Sociology, Pp. 234–
251.
Hirsch, P. M.(1972). Processing fads and fashions: An organization-set anal-
ysis of cultural industry systems. American journal of sociology, Pp. 639–
659.
Lopes, P. D.(1992). Innovation and diversity in the popular music industry,
1969 to 1990. American sociological review, Pp. 56–71.
McGahan, A. M.(1999). The performance of us corporations: 1981-1994.
Journal of industrial economics, Pp. 373–398.
McGahan, A. M. and M. E. Porter(1999). The persistence of shocks to
profitability. Review of economics and statistics, 81(1):143–153.
Ordanini, A.(2006). Selection models in the music industry: How a prior
independent experience may affect chart success. Journal of Cultural Eco-
nomics, 30(3):183–200.
Peterson, R. A. and D. G. Berger(1975). Cycles in symbol production: The
case of popular music. American sociological review, Pp. 158–173.
Power, D. and D. Hallencreutz(2002). Profiting from creativity? the music
industry in stockholm, sweden and kingston, jamaica. Environment and
Planning A, 34(10):1833–1854.
Scott, A. J.(1999). The us recorded music industry: on the relations between
organization, location, and creativity in the cultural economy. Environ-
ment and Planning A, 31(11):1965–1984.
SGAE(2012). Anuario SGAE de las artes escénicas, musicales y audio-
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (i): average roa and main covariates by coun-
try and total. (Sales, operating revenue and assets in ’000 euros.)
Assets
cntry ROA Revenue Total Fixed Employees
Austria 11.81 10,053.23 8,760.18 1,529.78 24.59
Belgium 3.98 12,464.77 10,182.86 3,958.51 14.93
Spain -1.10 5,158.52 6,992.68 2,729.65 15.69
France 1.67 19,168.11 35,255.85 20,503.72 51.72
UK 6.13 33,212.28 46,313.82 12,184.76 85.18
Italy 3.74 7,005.67 13,236.15 5,160.34 20.35
Norway 4.21 2,693.26 1,989.17 513.32 4.62
Sweden -0.99 2,911.95 3,496.52 475.67 5.40
Total 2.77 11,646.23 22,725.78 7,952.99 28.00
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (ii): mean, standard deviation and coefficient
of variation of ROA and main covariates by type of record label. (Operating
revenue and assets in million euros.)
Assets
ROA Revenue Total Fixed Employees
2.31 3.57 3.03 0.83 12.34 mean
Indep. 21.50 1.19 9.94 4.50 28.65 sd
9.29 3.35 3.28 5.39 2.32 cv
4.72 45.76 132.67 47.66 94.84 mean
Majors 15.88 77.88 395.32 160.40 152.09 sd
3.37 1.70 2.98 3.37 1.60 cv
26
Table 3: Distribution of ownership concentration.
Description Freq. Percent Cum.
All shareholders < 50% ownership 76 16.3 16.3
At least one shareholder > 50% ownership 265 56.7 73.0
Unknown 126 27.00 100.0
Total 467 100
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Table 4: Estimation results. Dependent variable: return on assets (roa).
Model (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
FE RE 3-level 3-level 3-level
MAJOR 4.6849 4.0615* 4.8237**
(2.9195) (2.2345) (1.8046)
OWNERSHIP -1.1087 -0.3213 -1.0964 -1.5833
(2.6327) (2.0383) (1.6658) (1.7664)
HHI 0.0013* 0.0013** 0.0015** 0.0013** 0.0013**
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006)
RATIOFIXED -5.2676 -5.4511* -5.4722** -8.7446** -11.1432**
(3.6511) (2.9345) (2.6870) (1.9278) (2.3681)
RATIOINTANGIBLE -3.3191 -2.5222 -2.2115
(5.3546) (4.4774) (4.1435)
lnEMPLOYEE -2.5479** -2.0487** -1.6043**
(0.9819) (0.7344) (0.6544)
lnTOTALASSETS 9.8393** 4.8390** 3.8039** 4.4500** 5.5688**
(3.1275) (1.7319) (1.4237) (0.9957) (1.4711)
lnTOTALASSETS2 -0.4201** -0.2268** -0.1735* -0.3047** -0.3876**
(0.1975) (0.1097) (0.0893) (0.0689) (0.1130)
LIQUIDITY -0.1420 -0.1523* -0.1503* -0.0662 -0.0740
(0.0880) (0.0801) (0.0796) (0.0518) (0.0601)
GEARING -0.0160** -0.0148** -0.0145** -0.0156** -0.0155**
(0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0029)
Estimated random effects variances
Country (U0j) 3.9860 10.0547** 11.4096**
(4.1405) (6.8568) (8.3297)
Between firms (U0ij) 68.33075** 74.5044** 77.5674**
(10.7594) (8.6481) (10.5785)
Within firm (εijt) 156.3291** 226.0947** 255.8550**
(6.7917) (6.6215) (8.3904)
N 1389 1389 1389 2748 2226
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Table 5: Estimated variances for: (a) a random intercept which differs
between major and independent labels (permanent component); (b) het-
eroskedastic residuals with respect to dummy variable major (transitory
shock).








Table 6: Robustness check: estimation of a logit model (dependent variable:
profits/losses). Fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE).
Model (a) (b) (c) (d)
Specification FE RE FE RE
MAJOR 0.5733 1.1348**
(0.4540) (0.3438)
HHI 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002*
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
OWNERSHIP 0.1617 0.2794
(0.3877) (0.2734)
RATIOFIXED -2.3243** -1.5942** -2.3509** -1.8805**





ln(TOTALASSETS) 1.4154** 0.6556** 1.2288** 0.7722**
(0.6191) (0.2716) (0.3607) (0.1610)
ln(TOTALASSETS)2 -0.0481 -0.0267 -0.0545** -0.0491**
(0.0400) (0.0171) (0.0272) (0.0115)
LIQUIDITY -0.0156 -0.0266 -0.0002 -0.0034
(0.0201) (0.0171) (0.0115) (0.0090)
GEARING -0.0026** -0.0023** -0.0021** -0.0022**
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004)
N 911.000 1373.000 1997.000 3162.000
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